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THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL ATTORNEY IN
MASS AIR DISASTER LITIGATION
F. LEE BAILEY*
AARON J. BRODER**
INCE the passage of Title 28 U.S.C. section 1407 on April
29, 1968, providing for consolidated pre-trial procedures, it
has become a virtual certainty that mass disaster aircraft litigation
will find its way into a single federal jurisdiction. Actions pending
in various federal courts will be consolidated under this section in
a single jurisdiction for the ostensible purpose of completing all
pre-trial discovery.
As a practical matter, these transfers under section 1407, which
are for pre-trial procedures only, will be followed by a further
consolidation, either for all purposes-i.e., a common trial on
liability, and a separate trial on damages-or, in some instances,
for a common trial on liability only, with the return of each indi-
vidual case thereafter to the jurisdiction in which it had been in-
stituted for a trial on the damages only.
Notwithstanding the fact that the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) holds extensive hearings, compiles extensive ex-
hibits, and that the recording devices aboard the aircraft, as well
as on the ground, frequently depict the last minutes of the tragic
episode leading to the mass disaster, there ensues in almost every
case an imbroglio of discovery procedures hitherto unknown in
accident litigation. It is no exaggeration to state that tens of thous-
ands of pages of depositions and documents are collected during
the course of extensive discovery. In many instances, the discovery
undertaken by the plaintiffs inures to the benefit of one or another
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of the co-defendants. A typical example involves a case in which
the carrier is the primarily culpable party, with the manufacturer
of either the plane or a component part, and the United States
Government, sharing a part of the blame. During the course of
pre-trial proceedings, it is not unusual for the plaintiffs to uncover
sufficient evidence to implicate the lesser-responsible parties who
perhaps had remained unscathed by the investigation undertaken
by the NTSB.
These extensive procedures concomitant with the multidistrict
approach often involve a repeat of the procedures followed by the
NTSB, whose hearings are transcribed and are available, but are
not generally admissible in civil litigation. Not only are transcrip-
tions available of the testimony received at these hearings, but in
addition, the exhibits, investigatory statements, and the like, are
also available. So, too, are the read-outs made of the cockpit voice
recorder and the instrument flight data recorder on the aircraft.
The work undertaken in this discovery procedure is that tradition-
ally assigned to attorneys on the staff of trial counsel who, more
often than not, are the heads of their firms, and who specialize in
the courtroom presentation of the evidence which has been accu-
mulated by their staff.
Whether by reason of this extensive pre-trial discovery made
possible by sharing of expenses under the multidistrict procedures,
or by reason of the essential equity of the claims of innocent pas-
sengers or their survivors who have fallen victim to the dereliction
of the carrier or of the manufacturer of the aircraft or of the Gov-
ernment, the simple fact is that, more and more, we are finding that
defendants, without conceding liability, are nevertheless in one
form or another waiving their defenses on liability, and are
seeking trials on damages only. For example, in the Lebanon,
New Hampshire Crash, the Florida Everglades Crash, and the
Upperville, Virginia Crash, the defendants simply reached the
point, after extensive discovery, where their resistance to payment
of compensatory damages was withdrawn. On the other hand, in
the West Virginia Crash, the need for discovery was obviated by
the defendants' concession as to responsibility for compensatory
damages under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Statute.
In the Paris Crash litigation, the defendants have adopted this
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posture only as to liability for compensatory damages. Claims for
punitive damages are being asserted in that litigation, which the
defendants strenuously oppose. They have taken the position that
in those cases in which the plaintiffs agree to waive any claim for
punitive damages, the defendants will not press their defenses and
will proceed to assessment of compensatory damages, whether by
agreement or by trial. However, the plaintiffs who insist on main-
taining their claims for punitive damages face a liability trial, now
scheduled for October 1976, in which the defendants intend to
contest liability not only for punitive damages but for compensatory
damages as well.
A prominent defense attorney in the field of mass disaster liti-
gation, and a competent trial lawyer himself, has commented most
cogently on this point:
Aside from legal questions with respect to the efficacy of the
1407 transfer we have found a very practical objection insofar
as defendants are concerned. Generally speaking, it doesn't take
a defendant in any major aircraft disaster very long to determine
the extent, if any, of his liability. At the same time, no defendant
is interested in a drawn out discovery proving what it already
knows-the nature and extent of its liability. Rather, these de-
fendants would prefer to negotiate prompt fair settlements. Ex-
perience has shown that settlements of this type are virtually im-
possible once the local litigation is "multidistricted." Indeed,
even when defendants express an evident interest in settlement
the transferee courts often neglect to accept the challenge. Thus,
one of the main aims and desires of the Congress and the Multi-
district Panel is frustrated, namely, the speedy, economical deter-
mination of mass litigation.' (Emphasis added.)
This, of course, presents a rather optimistic view of settlement
possibilities prior to the undertaking of extensive pre-trial work.
The need for pre-trial discovery varies from case to case. While
experience has demonstrated that more often than not extensive
pre-trial discovery is undertaken, the question is whether it is
helpful, or even necessary. Frequently it assists in clarifying lia-
bility as among the various defendants, since liability with respect
to innocent passengers is usually a fairly clear-cut proposition.
One might ask whether the development of these refined tech-
1 Martin, Multidistrict Litigation-A Panacea Or A Blight?, 10 THE FORUM
853, 865 (1975).
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niques under the mass litigation approach has left any room for
the trial attorney who has become expert in the presentation of
cases to court and jury. It has been our experience that more than
ever, a competent trial lawyer who is prepared to devote special
attention to the requirements of the individual cases in which he
has been retained remains the only assurance of adequate and just
compensation.
In most cases, during the course of the pre-trial procedures, there
is intensive dedication to the common questions of law and fact in
the mass disaster, but other questions arise which are peculiar to
the rights of the individual litigants. As to these individual rights,
there can be no substitute for the traditional method of preparing
the case. Thus, in the first instance, trial counsel must see to it that
his client institutes the action in the jurisdiction which will afford
the maximum recovery. For example, Florida law allows damages
for the grief, anguish and mental pain and suffering endured by
a surviving parent who has lost a minor child. Further, at least to
this time, Florida has continued the lex loci delicti doctrine in its
choice of law rules. Clearly, trial counsel who is consulted in an air
crash case occurring in Florida will insist that the action be insti-
tuted in Florida, unless the law of the domicile of the deceased
and his survivors provides a more liberal standard for the measure-
ment of damages. Examples may be culled from almost every mass
disaster case to substantiate the importance of this initial deter-
mination. Suffice it to say that this is only the beginning of trial
counsel's obligation.
The case on damages must be tailor-made to fit the given situa-
tion. Thus, in the air disaster which occurred near Upperville,
Virginia, actions were commenced in Virginia since its law allows
damages for mental pain and anguish of the survivors. Detailed
investigation was done, of course, including in-depth interviews
with family members, clergy, friends, business associates, and other
persons in the community who might shed light upon significant
aspects of the behavior patterns of the survivors. Alterations in
their conduct could be related to deep-seated despondency arising
from their bereavement.
Needless to say, it is necessary to make a careful search for
documents which might establish the closeness of the relationship
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to the deceased. In one case, the records of a religious family
service organization provided crucial evidence because these rec-
ords revealed details of survivor problems, manifesting mental
anguish which corroborated the tremendous impact upon them of
the death of the loved one.
After the investigation has begun, it must be periodically up-
dated in order that the full history from the date of death to the
point of trial be documented and brought to the attention of the
trier of fact. Further, the damage claim must be detailed in inter-
rogatories or depositions, lists of witnesses and documents must
be supplied, and frequently, experts must be deposed as a precon-
dition to the admissibility of their testimony at the time of trial.
All of this requires the close attention of trial counsel; it will be
his job to project the totality of the loss sustained by the survivors,
and he must be aware of the kind, nature and quality of the proof he
proposes to offer.
Even in jurisdictions which adhere to a strict pecuniary standard
of measurement of damages in wrongful death cases, loss of services
is frequently regarded as a species of pecuniary loss. In some states,
this is written into the statute; in others, judicial interpretation
has allowed for this type of proof.' Thus, in a case where the de-
2 Thus, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), the Court
first explains that loss of actual monetary support-i.e., financial contributions of
the decedent to the dependent survivors-is universally recognized as a basis for
damages. Going one step further, the Court then states that the overwhelming ma-
jority of wrongful-death statutes provide for the monetary value of loss of services
as an additional basis for a pecuniary award. Where the statute does not specifically
so provide, the Court points out, the courts have interpreted pecuniary loss as per-
mitting recovery for the monetary value of the services of the deceased. The Court
says, in part:
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-death acts
and courts interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act have per-
mitted recovery for the monetary value of services the decedent
provided and would have continued to provide but for his wrongful
death. Such services include, for example, the nurture, training,
education, and guidance that a child would have received had not
the parent been wrongfully killed. Services the decedent performed
at home or for his spouse are also compensable. Sea-Land Services,
Inc., supra at 585.
Another example is to be found in the New York statute, N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS
& TRUSTS LAw § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967), which provides for fair and just com-
pensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the
persons for whose benefit the action is brought. Although the statute does not spe-
cifically include loss of services, nevertheless the courts in New York have con-
sistently gone beyond the amount contributed by the deceased for the support of
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cedent is a mother, her child's deprivation of the religious and
moral training the mother would have provided is a fruitful area
for exploration. Of necessity, this will require consultation with
clergy and perhaps school teachers, who can attest to the kind
and quality of the supervision given by the deceased mother in
the care and guidance of her child. Another aspect of the loss of
the mother in such a situation entails the use of an experienced
home economist to translate the loss of the mother's care and
services in the home into terms of dollars and cents. This, of course,
is not permitted in all jurisdictions, but where allowed may prove
to be a valuable adjunct to the proofs.
We do not mean by these references to provide an exhaustive
list of all the things which must be accomplished to properly pro-
ject the loss to the survivors by the wrongful death of the victim
of a mass disaster. We merely wish to point out that the role and
function of the trial lawyer, as it has evolved within our tradition,
has in no way become anachronistic by reason of the present ap-
proach to pre-trial discovery under section 1407. To the contrary,
because the common questions of law and fact have spawned a
paper-work deluge never before reached in accident litigation, it
becomes even more necessary for each case to be handled on an
individual basis by capable trial lawyers who will not be deflected
in their pursuit of a full recovery by the diversions attendant to
over-abundant discovery.
When the case reaches the pre-trial stage, the trial lawyer must
formulate a plan for the introduction of witnesses and documents
in conformity with the prevailing local rules. It is not uncommon
his survivors and have permitted an award to include loss of services in the nature
of guidance, advice, and care of a deceased spouse or parent to his surviving spouse
and child. See Lucivero v. Long Island R.R. Co., 22 Misc. 2d 674, 200 N.Y.S.2d
728 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The Florida Wrongful Death Act is a further illustration.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (Supp. 1976) states:
Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and services
from the date of the decedent's injury to his death, with interest,
and future loss of support and services from the date of death and
reduced to present value. In evaluating loss of support and services,
the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the amount of the de-
cedent's probable net income available for distribution to the par-
ticular survivor, and the replacement value of the decedent's services
to the survivor may be considered. In computing the duration of
future losses, the joint life expectancies of the survivor and the
decedent and the period of minority in the case of healthy minor
children may be considered.
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for a judge to order a series of pre-trial discussions before a mag-
istrate, in which the issues are narrowed and the authenticity and
admissibility of documents are stipulated to or ruled upon in a
preliminary hearing. This, in itself, in a properly prepared pre-
sentation, may require much time, effort and research.
Finally, on the day of the trial, with the witnesses and docu-
ments assembled and the case ready, the trial lawyer proceeds
in traditional fashion to present his evidence. This requires a
minute-by-minute evaluation and re-evaluation of all of the de-
velopments. During the course of the trial, he may well decide
for one reason or another to withdraw offers of evidence or elim-
inate someone from the roster of witnesses; however, his actual
presentation of the individual case varies not one iota from the
presentation of any other wrongful death action.
The guarantee to the citizen of the right to be represented by a
lawyer of his own choosing has become even more significant be-
cause of the intrusion upon the lawyer-client contract of the rules
requiring the consolidation of mass disaster cases into one juris-
diction. Although the initial consolidation under section 1407
involves only pre-trial procedures, nonetheless the liability trial,
if one becomes necessary, will in the greatest likelihood be a con-
solidated trial. In no instance, however, can or should the damage
trials be consolidated, because they encompass individual ques-
tions of fact. It would, in our opinion, be so prejudicial to the
rights of a party to have his damage claim conjoined with that of
an unrelated party as to warrant reversal.
The treatment accorded damage trials does vary from court to
court. In the Virginia air disaster, all the damage trials took place
before the transferee judge. In the Everglades disaster, for those
cases which were instituted in jurisdictions other than Florida,
the damage trials were returned to those jurisdictions after the
defendants withdrew their defenses to the liability aspect of the
litigation. In the Paris Crash litigation, which is presently pending
in California, claims for compensatory damages are being sub-
mitted, on a voluntary basis, by those plaintiffs who have waived
any claim to punitive damages, to arbitration panels which have
been set up by the court, with the agreement of the defendants that
they will not press their defenses to liability before those arbitra-
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tion panels. It appears most likely that the cases for compensatory
damages which are not settled before these panels will not be re-
turned to the jurisdictions where the actions were originally com-
menced but will be tried in California. In fact, Senior United
States District Court Judge Peirson M. Hall, who is presiding in
the Paris Crash litigation, has indicated in an extensive opinion
that the applicable law on the measure of damages involving all
of the decedent estates is to be the California law, with the proviso
that the concept of "pecuniary loss" will be applied in accordance
with the definition given in the case of Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet.'
From the point of view of the trial lawyer, the presentation in
this instance will, of necessity, include not only an analysis of the
loss to the survivors of financial contributions (whether in terms
of money or other material things of value), but a considerable
number of other benefits of which the survivors have been deprived.
3414 U.S. 573 (1974). In this case the Court held that the maritime wrongful-
death remedy allows a decedent's dependents to recover damages for loss of sup-
port, services, and society, as well as damages for funeral expenses. The Court
had no problem in sustaining an award for loss of support since this is universally
recognized. Moreover, it found the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-death
acts and courts interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act have permitted re-
covery for the monetary value of loss of services. However, when it reached the
issue of compensation for loss of society, as a measure of damages, the Court
found a much closer question to have been presented. In accepting loss of society
as an additional basis for an award in maritime wrongful death cases, the Court
stated:
Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a closer question.
The term "society" embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each
family member receives from the others' continued existence, in-
cluding love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and
protection. Unquestionably, the deprivation of these benefits by
wrongful death is a grave loss to the decedent's dependents. Despite
this fact, a number of early wrongful-death statutes were interpreted
by courts to preclude recovery for these losses on the ground that
the statutes were intended to provide compensation only for "pe-
cuniary loss" and that the loss of society is not such an economic
loss. Other wrongful-death statutes contain express language limiting
recovery to pecuniary losses; for example, the Death on the High
Seas Act limits recovery to "a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit
is brought . . " 46 U.S.C. § 762 (emphasis added), and con-
sequently has been construed to exclude recovery for the loss of
society.
A clear majority of States, on the other hand" have rejected such
a narrow view of damages, and, either by express statutory provision
or by judicial construction, permit recovery for loss of society.
414 U.S. at 585-87.
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Included are: the nurture, training, education and guidance which
would have been furnished by a decedent father to his children;
and the loss of his society which, of necessity, embraces a broad
range of benefits which are cut off by his wrongful death, including
love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort and pro-
tection. In a case which involves the death of a spouse, the loss
of the solicitude, aid, comfort and consortium of the spouse pro-
vides additional damage aspects.
Thus, the problem of projecting losses, which may not be shaped
by mathematical formulae nor provided with scientific precision,
necessarily involves the trial lawyer in day-by-day decisions during
the course of the trial as to the nature, extent and direction of the
proofs. He must bring all of his ability to bear in order to predict
the effect that his presentation is having upon the trier of fact,
and make the necessary last-minute alterations in his proofs and
in his presentation to illuminate more fully the loss actually suf-
fered by his client. This emphasizes the significance of the need
to tailor and fashion the presentation of the law suit in a mass
disaster type of accident with the same care and individualized
attention as has always been required in the more usual type of
case. More than ever, it is necessary for the victims of such mass
disasters to be protected from the dilution of their rights by the
multidistrict consolidation approach. Counsel must remain alert
to the need for withstanding the pressure brought to bear by this
newly-evolving system which, in the absence of the needed vigi-
lance, may well result in diminishment of individual rights.
It is obvious that each individual case must, by reason of the
nature of the instrumentality involved in the accident-i.e., an air-
craft-represent an individual disaster to a given family which, in
microcosm, reflects the major disaster of the entire group. Death,
paralysis or bodily mutilation are typically the results of episodes
which form the basis of this class of law suit. With such dire con-
sequences in each individual case, it can readily be seen that each
one will generally warrant the fullest kind of preparation and trial.
Moreover, more often than not, it will be necessary to bring a given
case up to the point of trial in order that its full value be realized
for the client.
It is clear that the role and function of trial counsel in this class
19761
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of case is in no way diminished by the multidistrict rules which
now prevail in the federal court system. However, the trial will
usually be solely on the issue of damages since most of the time the
defendants will have agreed among themselves to share the respon-
sibility in certain percentages. It therefore remains necessary for
trial counsel to prepare his damage case extensively in order to
assure maximum client benefit.
